



"L'exactitude ce n'est pas la v6rit."
Henri Matisse, quoted in
Robertson Davies, Wvhat's
Bred in the Bone 334 (New
York, 1985)
"[A] legal system . . .accommodates the equally exigent de-
mands of being and meaning... in a universe in which what a
thing does is only one of the things that it means, but every-
thing that it means is something else that it does."
Arthur Leff, "Law and ...
87 Yale Law Journal 989 (1978)
Lawrence Friedman is a rare and remarkable phenomenon.
He is a counter who thinks and a thinker who counts. He is aware
of paradoxes such as the fact that "Everybody is an individual;
everybody is also a conformist" (1985b: 102). More specifically,
Friedman is particularly knowledgeable about the limitations and
unpredictable consequences of efforts at legal reform. Yet, sur-
prisingly, he seems somehow to be able to escape transforming his
healthy skepticism into cynicism.
A list of Lawrence Friedman's publications would exhaust a
large chunk of my word limit. But such a list would serve an im-
portant function. It would suggest the range of Friedman's schol-
arly interests as well as his astonishing productivity. Even the ti-
tles of Friedman's articles and books belie a curious but prevalent
notion that Friedman leads an apocryphal band of reductionist-
functionalist-instrumentalists. There is a good deal of talk, and a
fair amount of scholarly critique published, attacking a group of
legal historians who ignore or deny the idea that legal categories of
thought have impact on society or that there are particularistic,
This essay was completed in the Fall of 1987. It is Lawrence Friedman's
way to have published a half dozen or so articles since then, too late to be in-
cluded in this discussion. The author thanks Daniel Offner for his research
assistance and Kathy Abrams, Mary Dudziak, Chip Lupu, Martha Minow,
David Seipp, Josephine Woll, Larry Yackle and, most particularly, Lance Cas-
sak and Carol Weisbrod for reading drafts and discussing Lawrence Fried-
man's work with me.
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changeable qualities in legal culture (Gordon, 1987; Vandevelde,
1980).
Yet in nearly-forgotten 1960s classics, for example, Friedman
introduced theoretical categories and perceptive analysis concern-
ing law reform and legal culture to legal history scholarship. He
led discussion of how legal institutions "have a definite role, rather
poorly understood, as instruments that set off, monitor, or other-
wise regulate the fact or pace of social change (1969a: 29).1 With
his characteristic concern for the kinetic quality of law, Friedman
provided important insights about desuetude, legalistic reasoning,
and the many constraints on judicial discretion.
Critics tend to ignore Friedman's leadership on issues of meth-
odology, theories of change, and questions of whether law follows,
leads, or mirrors society. Friedman is hardly the simple and pure
instrumentalist some describe.
To attempt to catch up only with what Friedman has done for
us lately--e.g., a book on the legal issues of age discrimination and
mandatory retirement; another on the tendency toward total
justice and plural equality in the twentieth century; a chapter on
changing legal consciousness concerning the rights of schoolchil-
dren; a massive revision and expansion of his single-volume his-
tory of American law; articles on diverse additional subjects in-
cluding, uncharacteristically, one that invades the turf of
constitutional law (1984a, 1984c, 1985b, 1986; Friedman et al.,
1987)-suggests the enormous breadth of Friedman's careful, lucid,
and adventurous scholarly achievements.
There can be little doubt that Friedman's work on the pene-
tration of social, economic, and political factors into legal
thought--and his less well known and, to be sure, his lesser em-
phasis on the reverse phenomenon--constitutes a remarkable, pio-
neering scholarly accomplishment. Today, however, there is sig-
nificant controversy about Friedman's oeuvre overall. That
controversy raises several questions worth pondering. Is Fried-
man's work appreciated as it should be? Why does he feel targeted
in generational combat as one of "the dragons that need killing?"
1 See, for example, Friedman's many articles in the 1960s discussing the
relative power of legal ideas such as "Law Reform in Historical Perspective,"
13 St Louis Law Review 351 (1969); "Legal Culture and Social Development",
4 Law & Society Review 29 (1969); "Legal Rules and the Process of Social
Change," 19 Stanford Law Review 786 (1967); with Ladinsky, "Social Change
and the Law of Industrial Accidents", 67 Columbia Law Review 50 (1967); "On
Legalistic Reasoning-A Footnote to Weber," 1966 Wisconsin Law Review 148.
See also Friedman's discussion of the impact of legal ideas and the issue of
legal change in his books of that period such as Contract Law in America: A
Social and Economic Case Study (Madison, 1965) and Government and Slum
Housing: A Century of Frustration (Chicago, 1968) and his chapters "Social
Change Through Law" in Law and Society: An Introduction (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J., 1977), and "Social Change and Legal Change" in The Legal System
(New York, 1975).
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(1984c: 573) And where does Friedman stand on the continuum of
debate about the relative autonomy of law?
Throughout his work, on both micro- and macro-levels, Fried-
man has raised unanswered questions in regard to popular assump-
tions concerning historical causation. He has produced devastating
critiques of formalistic approaches to legal history. Moreover,
Friedman's descriptions of legal matters are peppered with vivid
contextual details and with recognizable, unexceptional folks. Yet
Friedman is the legal historian who deserves credit for introducing
important Weberian notions long ago as well as for offering a sen-
sitive critique of them. His work has demonstrated, early and
often, that scholars have much to learn from a bottom-up approach
to changes in legal ideas, as compared to more traditional tracking
of doctrinal change in appellate opinions and treatises.
In a sense, Friedman can be considered the last of the real
legal realists. But he also follows Willard Hurst as one of the first
and few legal realist historians.2 In emphasizing the dynamic qual-
ity of legal ideas, Friedman adapted and moved beyond Hurst's
work. As does Hurst, whom Friedman described as "this greatest
of legal historians [who] was not interested in law as such, but
rather in what it did to, for, or against the rest of us" (1984c: 566),
Friedman emphasizes factors outside the doctrinal law box.3 In-
deed, he directs witticisms at those who create fancy theories from
appellate decisions. Friedman describes law libraries as less hard
on the allergies than the down-and-dirty stuff of county court
records and the like. Although he has been careful not to deny
the symbolic aspect of law, Friedman concentrates on clashing in-
terests; he finds law in corporate personnel policies, trial courts,
and the hallways outside the courtrooms.
So why, one might ask, is Lawrence Friedman so alienated
from the legal historians who work under the umbrella of critical
legal studies? And why does his emphasis on competing interests
as the moving force behind legal change not seem to appeal to the
law-and-economics crowd? In this essay I suggest that Friedman is
able to convey the problematic role of law-as-mirror with remark-
2 The legal realists themselves were generally not seriously interested in
history, with the possible exception of Walter Nelles and the great efforts at
sweeping categorization by Karl Llewellyn and, later, Grant Gilmore. See gen-
erally John Henry Schlegel "American Legal Realism and Empirical Social
Science: From the Yale Experience" 28 Buffalo Law Review 3 (1981) and
"American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: The Singular Case of
Underhill Moore" 29 Bxffalo Law Review 2 (1980); Laura Kalman, Legal Real-
ism at Yale, 1927-1960 (1986).
3 For a most useful historiographic map delineating variations on the in-
ternal/external theme concerning how legal history has been done, see Robert
Gordon, "J. Willard Hurst and the Common Law Tradition in American Legal
Historiography," 10 Law & Society Review 9 (1975). See also Steve Diamond,
"Legal Realism and Historial Method: J. Willard Hurst and American Legal
History," 77 Michigan Law Review 784 (1979); Calvin Woodard, "History,
Legal History, and Legal Education," 53 Virginia Law Review 89 (1967).
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able clarity, even as he anticipates the distorting quality of reflec-
tion and its possible influence on conduct. Friedman's word-pic-
tures constantly remind us that neither life nor law is static, try as
we might to freeze the frames of our existence.
I. THE IMPACT OF THE IDEAS OF A LAW PROFESSOR?
It is paradoxical to write about the impact of any academic's
ideas, but the tensions are exaggerated when the subject is Fried-
man. One dare not speak of progress, but writers of legal history
generally have moved past the purportedly clearcut categories of
the lawyers who replaced parsons as described in Perry Miller's
work. We no longer seem eager for the neat symmetry that
turned Talcott Parson's tables. Today there is a serious, some-
times bitter split. Some scholars are concerned with the complex-
ity and importance of inquiry about how an average person feels
law and deals with it. Others wish to explore the inherent contra-
dictions in, and presumed legitimating functions of, mandarin legal
texts and techniques (Trubek, 1984: 575; Whitford, 1986: 75).
Some of Friedman's critics suggest that Friedman and others
of the Wisconsin school are unconcerned with the impact of ideas
generally and with the valuable cover story provided by legal my-
thology specifically. In response, Friedman and his law-and-soci-
ety cohorts tend to denigrate the attention lavished by abstract
thinkers on legal epiphenomena. Moreover, they doubt that ex-
posing contradictions in learned journals does much to advance
any radical cause or significantly aids any recognizable left or lib-
eral agenda. But the argument is about more than tactics; it may
even be over more than the traditional shadowboxing in interne-
cine warfare on the left.
Throughout his work, Friedman has emphasized that ele-
ments other than the rare flowers cultivated in the hothouses of
academe are crucial to how we, and, far more important, how
others not members of our small professional cliques, perceive law
and legal change. Repeatedly, in forceful metaphors, Friedman ar-
gues that society-the puppeter-pulls the strings and law re-
sponds. Law may be a peculiar dialect, but social and economic
forces create and develop the language for law's development. It
is, therefore, somewhat Dadaist to pursue Friedman's influence
through selections culled from his extraordinary scholarly output.
And it seems more than a trifle absurdist to violate Friedman's
own careful, skeptical canons concerning what is actually safe to
say about causation or intellectual influence.
What follows is a paradoxical, Pirandellian search for an au-
thor and his character. I begin by suggesting why any portrait of
Friedman as foremost practitioner of some dominant functionalist
or instrumentalist school of legal history committed to determin-
ism or swaddled in teleological faith is largely a caricature. In do-
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ing so, I will pursue how legal ideas reflect and help create social
change, with particular attention to Friedman's famous proclama-
tion in A History of American Law that his book "treats American
law ... not as a kingdom unto itself, not as a set of rules and con-
cepts, not as a province of lawyers alone, but as a mirror of soci-
ety" (1985a: 12).
In surveying Friedman's contribution, I concentrate almost ex-
clusively on the books Friedman has published in the past few
years (1985b: 102; 1985a). (Even if Friedman did not write with ex-
traordinary verve, and even if he did not combine his unusual clar-
ity with a knack for uncovering memorable nuggets within the
vast material he mines, news of Friedman's rate of scholarly out-
put should obviously be kept from those who set salaries and grant
tenure.) In the context of this "limited" sample of Friedman's
work, I will consider competing notions of how mirrors function.
4
Friedman is fascinated with change and with the problem of
how the historian can detect it. He is also quite cautious about
what we know and whether we have data to support how we know
it. At the same time, he recently has explored ways in which
deeply held, inconsistent, and frequently half-baked ideas about
law reflect and also influence American culture and character.
Because of his abiding concern for the public, i.e., for what
Everyperson believes about legal categories, whether she or he ac-
tually thinks about law or not, Friedman pays close attention to
the audience for law. He rejects auteur theories of legal creation.
Instead, he is fascinated with how feedback loops might work be-
tween society and the legal product. Friedman also manages to
blend his wit and hard-bitten skepticism with social consciousness
across a vast array of subjects. A central theme throughout Fried-
man's work is that law is shaped by the American public, but that
law also has a lesser, but still significant, shaping effect on Ameri-
can life.
I will suggest in conclusion why it is appropriate to move be-
yond mirrors and metaphors to consider the Friedman phenome-
non as some amazingly prolific, one-man major motion-picture stu-
dio. Friedman is most closely akin to Warner Brothers in the
1930s.
Warner Brothers' films generally managed to reflect changing
popular ideology throughout the New Deal. In the process,
4 I do so with the deference due both the great Groucho-in-a-nightcap se-
quence in "Night at the Opera" and Lewis Carroll's Through the Looking
Glass. But, as Alice says about the house on the other side of the looking glass
(Martin Gardner, ed., The Annotated Alice (New York, 1960: 180-182)):
I can see all of it when I get upon a chair-all but the bit just behind
the fireplace. Oh! I do wish I could see that bit! I want so much to
know whether they've a fire in the winter; you never can tell, you
know, unless our fire smokes, and then smoke comes up in that room
too-but that may be only pretence, just to make it look as if they
had a fire.
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Warner Brothers neither created a false need nor falsely filled a
real need (Roddick, 1983: 8). As in the best social conscience films
of the 1930s for which Warner Brothers is famous, Friedman's
work subtly but unmistakably reflects an important critical stance.
It also shows several different facets of an abiding social concern.
II. MIRRORS AND MIRAGES
Friedman's commitment to writing a book about law rather
than a law book (Abel, 1973: 175; Trubek, 1984: 575) is even clearer
than his own image of the mirror might suggest. He continues,
"[This book] takes nothing as historical accident, nothing as auton-
omous, everything as relative and molded by economy and society.
This is the theme of every chapter and verse" (1985a: 12). It is this
attitude that seems to infuriate many scholars or, in an ironic ar-
gument in the alternative, to be dismissed as a commonplace eve-
rybody already knows. Friedman's pathbreaking is often ignored
because the trails he blazed are now so heavily traveled. Though
Friedman's mirror analogy and his denial of legal autonomy
stirred considerable controversy when they were first postulated,
today hardly anyone argues that law is entirely autonomous or, for
that matter, that law never channels thought and action.
If we are candid, we must concede all legal history is done
with mirrors. Today's historiographic debates concern how dark
the glass is, whether there is in fact any "there" out there to be
reflected, and what to make of the inevitable distortion caused by
use of a mirror. In several senses, reflection is an inevitable part
of the legal historian's craft. But there are mirrors and then there
are mirrors.5 Moreover, what we seek tends to be what we get and
may be all we can hope to see. So there is vigorous debate today
among legal historians over the relative merits of contemplating a
few navels or attending exclusively to mandarins. It is on issues
such as these that Friedman often is caricatured (and sometimes
sees himself) as an embattled, autumnal law-and-society arche-
type.
Friedman's work does not get the appreciation it deserves for
several reasons. First, there is jealousy. Friedman is an exception-
ally clear, compelling and prolific writer who seems to produce
endless pages of luminous prose without the effort the rest of us
require. The very fact that he writes so much about so many dif-
ferent topics also makes it difficult to pigeonhole Friedman. This,
5 It may be that "Hell is--other people" particularly when one relies on
someone else as a looking glass. Jean-Paul Sartre, "No Exit" in No Exit and
Three Other Plays (New York, 1955: 20-21, 47). Moreover, as the adolescent
who spends a great deal of time gazing at himself in mirrors tells his father in
Peter Taylor's wonderful short story, "Promise of Rain": "[E]ven among mir-
rors there's a difference! Especially the big ones. They all give you different
ideas of how you look." (Peter Taylor, The Od Forest and Other Tales (New
York, 1985: 95). Cf. Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature
(Princeton, 1979)).
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in turn, frustrates our need for order as well as our desire to have
time for things other than keeping up with the literature current
in our professional fields. Next, because he often seeks and some-
times even finds an audience of nonspecialists, Friedman is derided
as a popularizer and a mere synthesizer. Moreover, in a paradoxi-
cal bit of generational combat, Friedman is attacked by younger
scholars both for lack of methodological sophistication and for in-
sistence on methodological care. Friedman is said by some to be
overly optimistic about incremental change while others find him
overly dubious if not cynical concerning the possibilities of radical
change.
To me what is most striking about Friedman's work, however,
is the extent to which he has successfully moved beyond the tradi-
tional debates between idealists and materialists, intellectual his-
torians and social historians. To a remarkable extent, Friedman's
work already achieves what Wood (1979: 27) has argued is needed
to meet the challenge of "nothing less than a revolution in our his-
tory-writing" (1979). Wood calls for "[A] kind of zoom lens that
will enable us to move easily back and forth from the small, close-
up world of unique events and individual volition where men try
to use ideas for their own particular purposes to the larger aggre-
gate and deterministic world of cultural conventions and collective
mentalities where ideas control men" (1979: 37).
Friedman moves with confidence and clarity between memo-
rable descriptions of actual people entangled in litigation and mas-
sive studies of what can be gleaned from litigation statistics over
many decades. He interweaves humanistic and social science
strands into vivid prose, often employing earthy imagery or flashes
of wit premised on ironic insights. Jars of applesauce, for example,
illustrate Friedman's points about safety regulation; our appetite
for chickens illustrates the problematic issue of the demand and
supply for legal resolutions.
What particularly distinguishes his work, however, is the ex-
tent to which it successfully anticipates the important historio-
graphic point recently made by David Hall. In considering the
overlapping worlds of print culture and collective mentality in sev-
enteenth century New England, for example, and in an essay re-
viewing recent historical work on the New England Puritans, Hall
points out that words and ideas mattered even to the unlettered la-
ity. There were "affective, aesthetic, and ritual dimensions" to the
multi-layered discourse of Puritanism as understood by both min-
isters and laity (Hall, 1987: 222). Hall notes that the newer histori-
cal work has "a new confidence in language, together with an un-
derstanding of language itself as essentially symbolic" (1979: 166).
This powerful point about Puritanism is, if anything, even
more powerful in the context of American legal history. The com-
mon sense of Americans not trained in law includes important as-
sumptions about what law will or will not, should or should not be.
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Obviously, lawyers and judges constantly address and appeal to the
perceptions of their lay audiences, albeit in varying degrees and in
differing contexts. Those with legal training occasionally attempt
to change common understandings of law, to be sure, but impor-
tant legal disputes still echo the nursery cry, "Not fair" (Milsom,
1982: 272).
In fact, it is Friedman's concern for what the general popula-
tion considers fair or not fair that sets his work apart from those
who focus on legal doctrine. He emphasizes society and de-empha-
sizes the clout of the legal elite, bridging what has seemed an al-
most unbridgeable gulf between the two competing ideas as to
which ideas count. Indeed, as Wood and Hall suggest, and as re-
cent attempts to incorporate perceptions from anthropology and
popular culture indicate, the gulf may be narrowing. Friedman's
insistence on the many contributions to our understanding of com-
munity-structured legal life is part of that process.
It is difficult to pin down and criticize Friedman, as it is to
criticize Maitland, in part "because of the caution with which he
formulated his answers, a caution not at first apparent in the
transparent lucidity of his style." It is also fair to say of Friedman
that, as with Maitland, "[i]t is virtually impossible to be bored...
even at his most technical, and seeing how very boring even good
historians can be this gives him a remarkable advantage" (Elton,
1985: 35). Friedman is similarly able to convey "what lies con-
cealed within the hard rind of legal history... the best, often the
only evidence we have for social and economic history, for the his-
tory of morality, for the history of practical religion" 6 (Maitland,
1911: 485). Unlike Holmes and others who make a fetish either of
constructing or demolishing doctrinal categories, Friedman has a
social theory of law in which society plays a leading role. People
peer out from behind the law he discusses.
Friedman echoes Maitland in other respects as well. (It may
be more than mere coincidence that Friedman's first historical
work in the 1950s was on English legal history, a realm in which
"the further back one went, the more one found law connected to
social structure, economic organization, agricultural method, ad-
ministrative practice, currents of religious and philosophical specu-
6 F.W. Maitland, 3 Collected Papers 485 (H.A.L. Fisher, ed. 1911). It may
be more than coincidence that Friedman was attracted to English Legal His-
tory and got an L.L.M. in that subject from the University of Chicago in 1953.
Before the contributions of William Hurst, and of his successors such as Law-
rence Friedman and Harry Scheiber, "the further back one went, the more
one found law connected to social structure, economic organization, agricul-
tural method, administrative practice, currents of religious and philosophical
speculation. The great researchers of the classical period and their successors
had given medieval law a context. But as one approached more recent times,
legal history started to thin out to the distinctly 'legal' again, and explanations
for the shape of legal things to revert to the genetic." Gordon, supra note 3, at
21.
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lation '" 7 (Gordon, 1975: 21)). As with Maitland, there is "the di-
rectness with which he speaks to you through the printed page"
(Milsom, 1982: 270) and the important sense in which he is able to
"feel some sympathy for both sides" (Ibid.: 271) in the real or im-
aginary conflicts that lead people to legal entanglement. Most cru-
cially, however, and perhaps more than even the great Maitland,
Friedman has a remarkable "sense for common feelings" (Ibid.:
281). He maintains an outsider's perspective but is not condescend-
ing about the people whose worlds are reflected in the legal detri-
tus he probes. Indeed, "the visions he communicates with such
power are of people whose situation he sees so clearly that he feels
their feeling." (Ibid.: 270). And Friedman discusses their messy
interlocking worlds with considerable humor and flair.
A. Total Justice: "An Epic Tale of Loss and Gain"
Overall, Total Justice serves as a fine example of Friedman's
clear, insightful, and provocative work (1985b). It is an exploration
of a theory of change in American legal culture, moving from ac-
ceptance of the harsh uncertainty of life in the nineteenth century
toward demands for legal remedies for greatly expanded categories
of injuries or rights in the twentieth century. As always, Fried-
man emphasizes the impact of social change on legal change rather
than the reverse. But his argument is anything but simple-minded
determinism.8 He insists, for example, that the choice of which
particular tort doctrines prevailed out of the vast array available
was neither primarily a product of the "taught tradition" Roscoe
Pound emphasized, nor was the evolution of tort doctrine "'inevi-
table' in a strict sense or 'determined' in every detail by economic
needs; least of all does it mean that the class solidarity of judges
shaped [tort doctrine] in a conscious way" (Ibid.: 56). Friedman
suggests instead that the mentality of boosterism prevalent in
nineteenth-century America was primarily responsible. An ex-
panding, industrializing nation, in which sudden death and serious
injury remained commonplace, got the tort law it seemed to want.
7 It happens that Charles Beard also did his first work, and his doctoral
thesis based on county histories and records, on "The Office of the Justice of
the Peace in England: In Its Origin and Development," Ellen Nore, Charles A.
Beard: An Intellectual Biography 18 (Southern Illinois University Press,
1983).
8 Starting with his earliest work, Friedman has accepted the idea that
legal ideas sometimes influence conduct, although his emphasis has always
been on the much greater influence of conduct on legal ideas. His disagree-
ment with those who today pursue the "relative autonomy of law" is not with
use of the concept itself but rather with where on the autonomy scale law
should be placed. (It is a given, after all, that relatives are not autonomous.)
See, e.g., Friedman, 1984a: 572-74 ("It is one thing to say that law is not merely
instrumental; it is quite another to behave or write as if it is not instrumental
at all, or as if its instrumental features do not matter as much as the rest of its
work"); Friedman, 1985b: 28 ("Every scholar worth his salt would agree that
the legal system has some autonomy; the question is, how much?").
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Total Justice is full of insights ("lawyers both prevent redress
and promote excessive redress" (Ibid.: 23); "[a] safety net encour-
ages some people to swing on the trapeze, or walk the tight-rope,
who would otherwise not dare" (Ibid.: 105) and strange-but-true
concrete examples: liberality in workmen's compensation is illus-
trated with the case of an employee who prevails after being hurt
while urinating from a moving truck; the persistence of moral and
religious notions enforced by law is illustrated by a 1921 Maine
Supreme Court decision upholding a conviction for blasphemy.
Moreover, to oversimplify a richly textured argument, Friedman
makes a powerful case that our current legal culture is composed
of fewer "zones of immunity" (Ibid.: 82) protecting the discretion
of government officials and civil defendants than it was in the
nineteenth century. Instead, we have increased expectations for
redress for a vast range of harms. But Friedman is careful to con-
sider a counterexample-an increase in the delegalization of atti-
tudes toward sexual conduct--and weaves that story into his
rather sweeping general assessment of how "attitudes become
processes and processes become institutions" (Ibid.: 148). Altered
legal consciousness and changes in legal culture, Friedman sug-
gests, do create tendencies to "bend toward the norm, like plants
bending and growing toward the light" (Ibid.: 67).
It might appear that in Total Justice Friedman is responding
to those who have criticized his emphasis on how social norms con-
trol law. This book emphasizes more than any of his earlier work
what Friedman rather abstractly refers to as the effect of an "up-
ward spiral" of alterations in social norms. But Friedman actually
has long acknowledged the symbolic function of law and has taken
into consideration what we have come to call the relative auton-
omy of legal ideas a focus of his work in the 1960s.
More significantly, Friedman continues to look for explana-
tions. He tests his emphasis on the control of social forces over
law by wrestling with legal categories in which, at least at first
glance, it seems extremely difficult if not impossible to explain
why some rules rather than others prevail. Friedman makes the
point that it is difficult to tell who benefits from certain commer-
cial law arrangements rather than others, for example. 9 He also
9 "It is doubtful that majestic capitalism would have smothered in its crib
without the rule of caveat emptor. It is doubtful whether specific doctrines of
commercial law were cause, effect, or condition of American capitalism; or all
or none of these." History of American Law, p. 264. As Gordon notes, in this
respect-as in many others-Friedman does not fit the paradigm of the domi-
nant vision of legal history, which Gordon terms evolutionary functionalism
(36 Stanford Law Review 57, 76, n. 47). See also, e.g., Friedman and Macaulay
agree with disengagement theory of autonomous law, positing that there is
"law of leftovers," id., p. 89, n. 79; Friedman shows in family law context that
legal enactment may not have effect, since it merely ratifies social relationship
already crystallized, id., p. 91, n. 83; Friedman as an example of the "marvel-
ous work" using a cultural anthropology approach, id., p. 95, n. 89. All these
footnotes make Friedman sound like a creative CLS type. But if it is not
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recognizes that for every social trend there seems to be a counter-
trend (Friedman, 1985a as criticized by Tushnet 1977: 81; Friedman
1985b: 151). But generally Friedman sustains a rather sobering,
and certainly humbling, argument that neither social engineering
nor impressive theorizing is likely to cause major changes, unless
external social factors are ripe for change.
Indeed, Friedman seems preoccupied by issues of legal change.
He is unquestionably a worthy successor to Hurst, but Friedman
seems less inclined than Hurst to accept consensus, inertia, and
drift as dominant social forces. Perhaps as part of his own genera-
tional revolt, Friedman constantly stresses the dynamic quality of
both social life and law. He perceives the world as somewhat akin
to a beehive of activity, its action primarily competitive and cha-
otic, rather than harmonious and steady. Friedman does not sacri-
fice realism for resolution.
B. Your Time Will Come: The Law of Age Discrimination and
Mandatory Retirement-"And You Won't Have
Everything!"
To his credit, Friedman does not shy away from difficult tests
for his hypotheses on the dominant role played by competing in-
terests in changing the legal world. For example, in his book on
the federal Age Discrimination Act of 1975--an act passed by Con-
gress "in a fit of absentmindedness (perhaps)" (1984a: 16)-Fried-
man contends with a legal infant copied from a civil rights proto-
type. The Age Discrimination Act passed without significant
support from identifiable pressure groups. In discussing this, as
well as a 1967 Act that banned some additional forms of age dis-
crimination in employment, Friedman points out that statutes
often serve as surrogates for other, more deeply contested inter-
ests. Friedman speculates that concern over age discrimination is
"a double stand-in." It approximates what he considers two impor-
tant, albeit also largely unrecognized principles: the first is the
civil rights principle, which attacks the use of any criterion consid-
ered to be unfair; the second is the tenure principle, which seeks to
protect expectations developed over time.
Friedman is quick to point out that these two principles are
largely unexamined and at least sometimes inconsistent. They are
only half-conscious norms. Yet, as usual, the categories Friedman
introduces provide useful scaffolding for organizing our thoughts.
He distinguishes between unfairness, which is "not against the law,
at least in so many words" and discrimination, "which is" (Ibid.:
48). Moreover, Friedman notes the symbolic function of antidis-
crimination laws, but he suggests that it is patterns of conduct that
Friedman, then who is the target-the evolutionary functionalist-against
which critical legal histories are to be arrayed?
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provide both crucial evidence and crucial targets for Draconian
legal change.
Friedman is again trailblazing in his attention to issues of age
discrimination, his collection and vivid description of concrete ex-
amples, and his attempt to reach an audience beyond the law
school professorate. Ultimately, however, in this book the some-
what abstract nature of the two categories he employs, coupled
with the open-ended quality of the stand-in notion, seem less well
grounded than does most of Friedman's work. Nonetheless, Fried-
man clearly advocates the use of law to help change consciousness,
since "[i]n justice, as society defines it, is also a cost" and since "the
sense of right has been a powerful motor force" (Ibid.: 52-54).
"The source of all law is the normative climate," according to
Friedman, but it is vital to recognize that "law crystallizes and for-
malizes lumpy or ghostly feelings, adrift in society; it hardens
them into definite shapes; and it sets up machinery that people can
use, to translate feelings into action" (Ibid.: 54, 66).
C. The Roots of Justice: Crime and Punishment in Alameda
County, California, 1870-1910--"Just the Facts,
Ma'am"
To be sure, some parts of Friedman's scholarly output-partic-
ularly the study of criminal records in Alameda County, Califor-
nia, he co-authored with Robert Percival--are so studiously
grounded in minute factual detail about the machinery of law that
at first glance they seem to cry out for more theory. Theory lurks
in all historic writing, of course, but The Roots of Justice may con-
tain too much data and too little explicit interpretation for readers
who crave clear narrative development, if not fancy overarching
theory. But the book is unquestionably a significant historical con-
tribution, and it shows Friedman is not blinded by teleological
faith.
Despite important variations in plea bargaining rates and ap-
proaches to guilty pleas in the period covered by the study, and de-
spite other, more minor changes, the class structure behind the
three-tiered criminal system a century ago in Alameda County
seems distressingly similar to the modem criminal law system
Friedman and Percival describe there today. We still use the for-
mal criminal law process in diverse ways, depending on whether
we employ it to process misfits; to administer punishments, for the
most part without jury trials, for more serious offenses; or to per-
form an educative function in the most sensational cases in which
lawyers dominate the process and we compose and broadcast the
official rules about what process is due. We still rely on the police
to help distinguish among these three categories, as well as to op-
erate a fourth level of discretionary justice (Friedman and Perci-
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val, 1981: 315). 10 If anything, the storyline in Roots of Justice lacks
reassuring movement. Neither clear progress nor clear regress
leaps out at the reader. The central point the authors make, how-
ever, is that even low-visibility categories of legal culture are brim-
ming over with so many variables as to make nice, neat generaliza-
tions impossible.
The Roots of Justice is rich in suggestive details. Its numerous
tables include data ranging from arrests broken down by national-
ity and age group to less obvious categories such as the number of
days between conviction and sentencing, broken down in terms of
types of offenses and status of attorneys involved, and the percent-
ages of total arrests for each offense class by time of day. We learn
the ethnicity, gender, age, and occupation of those arrested for a
number of different crime categories, that the successful prosecu-
tion of a typical license case actually cost Oakland more than sev-
enty dollars in 1879, and even the number of arrests per police of-
ficer and per population.
Further, the monumental task involved simply in gathering
the data for this study, with its relatively small yield of drama or
glittering generalities, helps to underscore why few have heeded
Friedman's perennial call to do the gritty work of digging out the
"kilo-Ph.Ds" buried in every county courthouse. Yet despite his
failure to win converts, Friedman remains not only remarkably
versatile in his own legal history research, but unusually generous
in his collaborations and in providing honorable mention to those
who build theories, produce biographies, or otherwise toil through-
out legal history's many rooms.
The glaring exception to Friedman's general generosity of
spirit, beyond the occasional barbs he aims at what he considers
the overly abstract meanderings of critical legal studies and the
overly simple conceptualism of law and economics, is Friedman's
general disdain for constitutional law. In this, he is undoubtedly
10 After Friedman and Percival published some of their preliminary data
in "A Tale of Two Courts: Litigation in Alameda and San Benito Counties,"
10 Law & Society Review 267 (1976), Richard Lempert wrote a lengthy article
reanalyzing their data, controlling for adult population. Richard Lempert,
"More Tales of Two Courts: Exploring Changes in the 'Dispute Settlement
Function' of Trial Courts," 13 Law & Society Review 91 (1978). Lempert made
the important point that paying attention to cases filed may miss an entire
range of disputes that never made it to court in the first place. This point is
not entirely lost on Friedman and Percival. And, as Lempert acknowledges, it
is easy to criticize any collection of data for not collecting more or something
else. Even the massive detail supplied by Friedman and Percival may be
merely the tip of a peculiar iceberg, though they do an impressive job of sup-
plementing their statistics with information culled from newspaper reports
and other less obvious sources of social history as well. As Friedman once put
it, "Reported cases, then, are always (or almost always) the tip of some sort of
iceberg. That may be fine; after all. . . the bottom of an iceberg may be much
like the top, that is, essentially ice. Reported cases, on the other hand, may or
may not tell us much about unreported cases or ordinary complaints..
(Friedman, 1984a: 47).
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true to the legal realist tradition (White, 1986: 452; Schlegel, 1984:
407-408; Llewellyn, 1934). In my view as a constitutional law
teacher, Friedman here is too narrow-minded. Moreover, he con-
tradicts his basic view that constitutional debate consists of poking
away at "a kind of living fossil, the last and most vigorous survivor
of conceptual jurisprudence" (Friedman, 1984c: 569), with his own
constitutional insights in his magisterial A History of American
Law. In his recent work, Friedman shows definite signs of dawn-
ing enlightenment concerning the worthiness of constitutional is-
sues for serious consideration (1986: 1; 1985b).
D. A History of American Law: "They Said It Couldn't Be
Done!"
A History of American Law is that part of Friedman's work
(so far) for which he is most likely to be recognized. If there are
legal historians in one hundred years-and if they are not all sim-
ply ferreting about in the dust of thousands of county court-
houses-they will have to come to grips with both the details pro-
vided and the sweeping story told in this remarkable book.
Friedman was probably a bit disingenuous when he offered his
book as a "whipping boy" and "a primer" (1985a: 10), but he was
surely accurate when he suggested that the book would provide "a
shape for the field, even if others find it misshapen" (Ibid.). When
first published in 1973, this snappy single-volume account provided
marvelous, memorable, and detailed examples of the numerous
ways in which American law was never immanent and hardly
static. 11
The enormous size, and considerable clout, of the landed mid-
dle class is the central thread in Friedman's impressively nuanced
book. Friedman calls this "the master fact of American law and
life" (1985a: 212). Perhaps it takes a mid-westerner fully to appre-
ciate the phenomenon. This may help explain why a place such as
Wisconsin nurtured the Hurst-Friedman school of legal history,
with roots stretching directly back to populist historians such as
11 The first edition received generally euphoric reviews, see, e.g., W. E.
Nelson, 18 American Journal of Legal History 182; H. A. Johnson, 23 De Paul
Law Review 1086; E. D. Tucker, 86 Harvard Law Review 1625; W. A. Hill, 50
N. D. L Review 147; S. J. Spitz, 36 Ohio S. L. J. 376; J. Lurie, 27 Rutgers Law
Review 354; E. F. Murphy, 26 Stanford Law Review 701; C. A. Pierce, 42 Tenn.
Law Review 615; J. H. Smith, 24 University of Toronto Law Journal 108; G. E.
White, 59 Virginia Law Review 1130; J. W. Ely, Jr., 26 Vand. Law Review, a
'few balanced critiques'; S. B. Presser, 122 University of Pennsylvania Law Re-
view 217; and L. J. Mazor, 60 Minnesota Law Review 147 and Mark Tushnet's
"wonderfully, or awfully (take your pick), foul-tempered review," John Henry
Schlegel, "Notes Toward an Intimate, Opinionated, and Affectionate History
of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies," 36 Stanford Law Review 391, 408,
discussing Mark Tushnet, "Perspectives on the Development of American
Law: A Critical Review of Friedman's A History of American Law," 1977
Wisconsin Law Review 81. Thus far, the second edition has had less attention
and more praise, see, e.g., Calvin Woodard in NY Times, Feb. 16, 1986, sec.
VIII, p. 31.
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Thorstein Veblen, Vernon Parrington, and, most significantly,
Charles Beard. Life in the land of the Northwest Ordinance may
go a long way toward immunizing historians against coastal neuro-
ses. They are alerted to the power and the persistence of the great
American Middle Class.
A Chicagoan only belatedly transplanted to America's dream-
land, California, Friedman demonstrates across a range of legal
subjects that middle-class dominance never was secure. In fact, if
his book has a single central subtext, it is movement. Legal ar-
rangements are seldom settled. The winners in legal contests are
anything but permanently ascendant. This is a crucial aspect of
Friedman's approach, an aspect that illuminates a great deal about
his general approach to legal history.
Friedman does not merely show snapshots. The metaphor of
moving pictures is more appropriate. Friedman explains why he
thinks, or perhaps hopes, that intrumentalism in the long run is
the enemy of what he calls "vertical pluralism," which is a concept
close to what some of his critics would discuss in terms of hege-
monic hierarchy, 12 provides a good illustration (1984a: 664). Re-
viewing what he has said about the nineteenth century, the period
in which he has done most of his work, Friedman discusses "mobil-
ity for the few and dreams for the many" (Ibid.: 665). He writes in
curmudgeonly language of a combination of factors that "acted as a
brake on demands for redistribution of the social product" (Ibid.).
But he also points out that the frontier was not the only safety
valve: "there was also the hope of success, the culture and cult of
opportunity," a metaphoric lottery for which tickets were hawked
"on every corner, in every town" (Ibid.).
Friedman devotes attention throughout this book to those peo-
ple he labels "The Underdogs" and to other victims of ascendant
interests. Consistent with much of the rest of his scholarship, he
reminds his readers of who got put down or kept down, even as he
goes about the business of mapping how the law generally re-
flected hard-edged competition. It is also characteristic of Fried-
man to have raised doubts about the purportedly progressive moti-
vation behind the Married Women's Property Acts, for example,
before the recent outpouring of attention to the subject, but subse-
quently to have cited the new work and not his own original con-
tribution.1
3
12 See A Historiy of American Law, 2d ed., p. 574 for a limited discussion
of the issue.
13 In "Law Reform in Historical Perspective," 13 St Louis Law Review
351, 362-363 (1969), Friedman used Married Women's Property Acts as an ex-
ample of a "hidden ratification," explainable neither in terms of a quiet yet
significant revolution suggested by the bare legal record nor in terms of a re-
sponse to pent-up social and economic pressure. He credited the unpublished
thesis of Ellen Thurman, as well as the compilation of family law statutes in 3
Vernier, American Family Law 166 ff. (1935). Though Friedman makes no
mention of the issue in the first edition of A History of American Law, he
1010 LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN'S MOVING PICTURES
In his recent work, Friedman often points out explicitly that
cost-benefit analysis celebrating efficiency tends to omit unquan-
tifiable, yet crucial, social costs. Ironically, this legal historian,
seemingly so committed to hard data and empiricism, often ap-
pears to distrust profoundly the results of the marketplace. He re-
fuses to accept the normative power of either the actual or the
actuarial.
The irony may be resolved if we consider Friedman's empathy
with those denied a fair place in the race of life and his sensitivity
to the problematic nature of feedback loops.1 4 For Friedman, law
is a part of the cult of opportunity. But belief in the revolutionary
power of law, or in the power of de-mystifying law, is belief in a
flickering, chimerical image. What Roddick said of the Hollywood
studios in the 1930s might be said about the legal system as well
(1983: 11):
The trends and events of public life provided the story ma-
terial for and therefore strongly influenced the output of
Hollywood; in turn, the image of themselves which the
movies reflected back to the movie-going public exercised
an influence on the same trends and events which had
given birth to the image.
Friedman's work suggests that legal culture is similarly part
of a circular relationship. There are obvious ideological overtones,
but the perpetual loop depends on gauging and responding to audi-
ence needs in a sense that is largely manipulative, but also occa-
sionally productive of an important focus for social consciences or
even achievements. Like a great film such as The Maltese Falcon,
A History of American Law has something for everyone: twists
and turns in the plot, memorable characters, illuminating humor-
ous moments, and vivid details that keep the viewer entranced.
Both also respond to some of our deepest myths about individual-
ism and society. And like Sam Spade, Friedman is hard-nosed and
apparently beyond the fray. But his world-weary pose turns out to
be just a pose when the crunch comes. He does the down and dirty
work, but he also knows how to lead, perhaps even to inspire.
III. HOW DOES IT ALL COME OUT?
A major element in the criticism of Friedman's work involves
dismay at his optimism. Friedman admits that he is in favor of
gains, even symbolic gains, against discrimination. Indeed, he sug-
gests, success may lie "precisely in the fact that the rules startle
cites generously to numerous recent studies in the 2d edition, pp. 208-211, but
not to his own 1969 article.
14 Even if "an exceedingly weak positive feedback loop" may be all that is
necessary to explain the origin of life, T.F.H. Allen and Thomas B. Starr, Hier-
archy: Perspectives for Ecological Complexity 49 (Chicago, 1982). Allen and
Starr indicate the complexity of positive and negative feedback loops in the
course of suggesting the importance of anticipation and purpose in "the
evolved physical world [that] trades in futures." Id., p. 60.
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people" (1984a: 63). Friedman is a committed academic activist.
His target, however, is more modest and almost certainly more re-
alistic than the assault on paradigms favored by critical legal stud-
ies and by law and economics. Even Friedman's awareness of the
folks who buy the tickets, his commitment to writing material that
can be read by nonspecialists, appears to flow from a quiet zeal for
reform.
Ironically, given the heat generated by the debate over what
degree of relative autonomy one favors, Friedman quite clearly be-
lieves, as he has for a long time, that "[existing] structures of law
and government, at least in the short run, exert a powerful influ-
ence on the way demands and attitudes become concrete" (1985b:
148). Additionally, he often expresses his willingness to accept
inefficiency in exchange for gains in social justice (Ibid.: 151). He
summarizes our legal culture's trend toward a total justice con-
sciousness, a goal he notes can never be achieved, as follows: "I
have to confess my personal sense of pleasure over many develop-
ments described. I like the spread of due process; I like the wel-
fare state; I like justice for minorities; I like the broader meaning
of equality, the great reach and depth of individual rights" (Ibid.).
Friedman does not believe that the social order is easily
smashed. He has an explicitly organic view, even though he recog-
nizes "the fallacy of extrapolation, expecting the future to be like
the past, only more so" (Ibid.: 34). This makes him a reformer, not
a revolutionary. It also helps explain why this tolerant scholar be-
comes somewhat intolerant of those who seem committed only to
raising contradictions. To him, it is not difficult to do that. Nor is
it at all clear that carefully-constructed deconstructions will some-
how trickle into a torrent of radical change.
The history of legal change is very much Friedman's bailiwick.
He has a sophisticated sense of the changes in the conditions of
confinement in America's "iron grip of tradition in a rigid but com-
fortable prison of habits and norms." This helps Friedman elude
common pitfalls. He does not cluck over a pattern of decline while
romanticizing an earlier, more communal golden age, nor does he
give way to despair. Friedman remains hopeful, despite the sub-
stantial congruence between his perspective and the bleaker point
made by Grant Gilmore that "Law never creates society; society
creates law. Law never makes society better; a better society will
improve the law"'15 (1966: 7).
Like Charles Beard, Friedman seems painfully aware that his-
torians necessarily "see what is behind our eyes" (Nore, 1983: 156).
15 Grant Gilmore, "Law, Anarchy and History," 14 University of Chicago
Law School Record 1, 7 (Autumn, 1966). The gap between the Friedman's still-
hopeful skepticism and Gilmore's darker vision is illustrated by Friedman's
puzzled response to Gilmore's work on the demise of contracts where Fried-
man says, "Gilmore's chief reason for regretting the death of contract theory
seemed nothing more than nostalgic sentimentality-a sense of longing for the
good old days, when scholars thought there was value in what they were do-
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Not even historians, who of all people should be aware of what
Graham Wallas termed the "paradox of unintended conse-
quences," are able to "force the iron gates of the future" (Ibid.:
156). Nevertheless, Beard and Friedman share a commitment to
the historian's professional search for "history-as-actuality" (Nore,
1983: 167), to taking an active role in public affairs, and to trying to
reach a broader public than do most historians by writing and
teaching with verve and clarity. Beard and Friedman are both fa-
mous for stressing the impact of economic interests on legal mater-
ials, but both are also frequently mischaracterized as believers in
determinism. As does Beard, Friedman acknowledges subjectivity
but celebrates the "inquiring spirit of science" (Ibid.: 166) as "the
chief safeguard against tyranny of authority, bureaucracy, and
brute power (Ibid.).
I have placed Lawrence Friedman in the august company of
Maitland and Beard. This association of a very funny, impish Jew-
ish fellow from Chicago with two austere WASP giants is obviously
problematic in numerous details. Yet Friedman belongs in their
company. He, too, deserves recognition for the clarity of his
thought, the richness of his scholarly understanding of ideas in so-
cial context, and the lucidity of his astonishingly prolific writing.
IV. CONCLUSION
It may be whimsical to compare Friedman's work with the un-
memorable films put out by Warner Brothers in the 1930s, but it is
not entirely frivolous or inapt. Warner Brothers achieved fame
and fortune for its gangster movies and newspaper films; social
conscience films that attacked racism, fascism, inhumane prison
systems and the like; "biopics" and more "classic" films. As Rod-
dick put it: "mhose films marked both contemporary audiences in
their attitude to the world and, in a different way, subsequent
ideas of what is or is not a 'good' film"'16 (1983: 254). The same
might be said of Friedman's legal history work.
Moreover, as did Warner Brother's social conscience pictures
ing." (Lawrence Friedman, "American Legal History: Past and Present" 34
Journal of Legal Education 563 (1984)).
The tension between the bleakness of what we think we know about law
and the idea that we hope to do better than we think we can through law was
explored with particular insight by Arthur Leff. As Leff put it, in a memorial
issue for Gilmore, Gilmore's bleak vision is probably right, but we are "lutists
of the unknowable" who, on our way to those final defeats, may sometimes
have "some beautiful innings." (Leff, "Law and .... " 87 Yale Law Journal
1011 (1978)).
16 For important recent work on the linkage and tension between popu-
lar culture and formal legal images of law, see David Papke, Framing the
Criminak Crime, Cultural Work and the Loss of Critical Perspective (Ham-
den, 1987); Stewart Macaulay, "Images of Law in Everyday Life: The Lessons
of School, Entertainment, and Spectator Sports," 21 Law & Society Review 181
(1987); Anthony Chase, "Toward a Legal Theory of Popular Culture," 1986
Wisconsin Law Review 527.
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such as I am a Fugitive from a Chain Gang, Wild Boys of the
Road, Angels with Dirty Faces, and Black Legion, Friedman also
assumes "the strengths of a basically sound if temporarily prob-
lem-ridden society" (Ibid.: 128). He also keeps an eye on the bot-
tom and middle of the social order. What today may seem idiosyn-
cratic about Friedman's work is his quiet confidence in being able
to communicate to a broad audience about social problems, com-
bined with a skeptical optimist's leap of faith in America's social
conscience. In a sense, Friedman's understanding of the powerful
strains of resistance and self-interest in American history liberate
him to battle for improvement. He knows of the "generous con-
cealment of mirrors" (Schwartz, 1987: 95). He also knows we need
mirrors to perceive what we must take as real, so we can do some-
thing to change it.
The considerable achievement of these social conscience films
was their blend of story-telling craft and powerful condemnation
of social outrages such as the chain gang system. Friedman's
scholarship also operates with power and persuasiveness on many
levels of craft and social consciousness. His massive outpouring of
scholarship surely enlightens all kinds of readers. Friedman's
work may even move people past personal reflections of what has
passed.
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